The influence of positive affect and visual access on the discovery of integrative solutions in bilateral negotiation by Carnevale, Peter J. D. & Isen, Alice M.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 37, I- 13 (1986) 
The Influence of Positive Affect and Visual Access on the 
Discovery of Integrative Solutions in Bilateral Negotiation 
PETER J.D. CARNEVALE 
College of Business Administration, University of Iowa 
AND 
ALICE M. ISEN 
Research Center for Group Dynamics, Institute for Social Research, 
University of Michigan 
The present study investigated the influence of positive affect and visual 
access on the process and outcome of negotiation in an integrative bargaining 
task. Visual access was crossed with positive affect in a 2 x 2 design. The 
results supported the hypotheses that positive affect would reduce the use of 
contentious tactics and would increase joint benefit, just as had been found 
for the presence of a barrier that eliminated visual access to the other nego- 
tiator (S. Lewis & W. Fry, 1977, Organizational Behavior and Human Per- 
formance 20, 75-92). This latter finding was also replicated. Only when bar- 
gainers were face to face and not in a positive state was there heavy use of 
contentious tactics, reduced trade-offs, and fewer integrative solutions. This 
means that positive affect can overcome the competitive processes and poor 
outcomes normally observed in face-to-face integrative bargaining. The results 
are discussed in terms of the cognitive dynamics of negotiation. 0 1986 Aca- 
demlc Press. Inc. 
Negotiation is a process by which two or more people make a joint 
decision with regard to an issue about which there are initial differences 
in preference. The present study examines the effects of positive affect 
and visual access on negotiation strategies and outcomes. 
Successful negotiation often requires the parties to discover integrative 
solutions. A solution in negotiation is said to be integrative to the extent 
that it reconciles the parties’ divergent interests and provides them high 
joint benefit (Follett, 1940; Pruitt, 1981; Walton & McKersie, 1965). 
“Joint benefit” refers to the collective gain of the parties in the final 
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agreement. Understanding the conditions and processses that lead to or 
detract from the discovery of integrative solutions is important because 
integrative solutions to conflicts contribute to the long-term stability of 
relationships and to organizational effectiveness (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1982). 
Integrative solutions can be contrasted with “compromise,” where 
concessions are made to a middle ground on some obvious dimension. 
The distinction between compromise and integrative solution can best be 
seen in situations where there are many possible solutions with different 
levels of joint benefit. Compared to other possible solutions, a compro- 
mise is a solution that only partly satisfies the two parties’ interests; it is 
often the result of a simple and obvious decision scheme such as “split 
the difference.” To illustrate the distinction between compromise and 
integrative solution, imagine two office workers arguing about the status 
of a window: one wants it open for fresh air, and the other wants it closed 
to reduce bothersome street noise. One solution, an obvious compromise, 
is to have it open half the day and closed the other half; each partly gets 
what she/he wants. A more integrative solution is to close the window in 
question and open a window in an adjacent room thereby reducing street 
noise while providing fresh air. Compared to the compromise solution, 
the integrative solution gives each more of what she/he wants. The task 
used in the present study involved a large number of negotiation alter- 
natives of which only a few could satisfy both parties’ interests. For each 
party to be successful, it was necessary that the pair search beyond the 
compromise alternatives and make mutually beneficial trade-offs. 
Negotiators have four basic strategies available to them, three of which 
may lead to agreement (Pruitt, 1983; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986): (1) problem 
solving, efforts to find an alternative that is acceptable to both parties; 
(2) contending or competitiveness, efforts to pursuade the other to accept 
alternatives that favor oneself; (3) yielding, a reduction in one’s basic 
aspiration; and (4) inaction (avoidance), which may delay or even prevent 
agreement. These authors present a model of strategy selection that stems 
from Blake and Mouton’s (1964) Managerial Grid and that has been 
adapted to the analysis of organizational conflict by others (Filley, 1975; 
Rahim, 1983; Ruble & Thomas, 1976, Thomas, 1976). Another strategy, 
compromising, is mentioned by these other authors. However, if we view 
compromising as a weak form of problem solving, it may not be necessary 
to postulate a separate strategy to explain the development of compro- 
mise agreements (Pruitt, 1983). 
The problem-solving strategy includes tactics such as the exchange of 
truthful information about needs and priorities, and a set of tactics re- 
ferred to as “trial and error,” involving (a) frequently changing one’s 
offer; (b) seeking the other’s reaction to each offer; (c) making larger 
concessions on items of lower priority; and (d) systematic concession 
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making, where a negotiator explores various options at one level of value 
to himself/herself before proceeding to a lower level. The contending 
strategy includes tactics such as threats, positional commitments, con- 
trived arguments designed to get the other to concede, and efforts to raise 
one’s status in the other party’s eyes. Past research (summarized in 
Pruitt, 1981) has found that contentious tactics interfere with the dis- 
covery of integrative solutions and that problem-solving tactics facilitate 
the discovery of integrative solutions (when yielding is prevented). 
The present study was designed to examine the influence of positive 
affect on negotiation strategies and outcome. Positive affect has been 
shown to influence social behavior and judgment. For example, positive 
affect has been found to increase generosity and helpfulness (e.g., Isen, 
1970; Isen & Levin, 1972), to raise sociability (Isen, 1970), to enhance 
liking for others and improve conceptions of human nature (Gouaux, 
1971; Veitch & Griffltt, 1976), and to influence evaluations of a variety 
of stimuli in a positive direction (e.g., Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp. 
1978). Moreover, Baron and his associates have found that nonhostile 
humor can lessen aggressiveness (e.g., Baron, 1984; Baron & Ball, 1974). 
Together these effects suggest that positive affect might reduce hostility 
and promote increased cooperativeness in negotiation; and, in fact. 
within negotiation contexts, there is evidence that mediators sometimes 
employ humor in their efforts to lighten hostile interactions (Carnevale & 
Pegnetter, 1985). 
Most recently, in addition, studies have shown that positive affect pro- 
motes integration and innovative solutions to problems (Isen, 1983; Isen 
& Daubman, 1984; Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson, 1985). These 
studies found that, relative to control groups, persons who had been 
made to feel good, in any of several ways, tended to group more stimuli 
together, to rate more stimuli as similar or as examples of the same cate- 
gories, to give a broader range of associations to common words, to show 
increased recall of a subset of words that could be related to one another, 
and to be more likely to solve a problem requiring a creative view-a 
view involving seeing potential relationships among the elements of the 
problem. The authors interpreted these results as suggesting that positive 
affect promotes the tendency to integrate elements in problem solving 
and perhaps to take a broader view of the situation. 
The ability or tendency to integrate elements in problem solving would 
seem to be central to successful performance in tasks such as the bar- 
gaining problem described above. The task requires making trade-offs in 
order to reconcile the parties’ divergent interests, and the potential to see 
creative ways of combining the various elements might be necessary in 
order to achieve anything beyond the most obvious compromise. Thus, 
for two reasons, we expected positive affect to lead to more optimal 
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integrative bargaining and negotiation outcome in the task described 
above: reduced hostility and increased integrative capacity. 
In addition to positive affect, this study examined the influence of 
visual access on negotiation. Negotiators have visual access if they sit 
face to face across a table from one another; they do not have visual 
access if a physical barrier prevents them from seeing one another, or if 
the negotiations are conducted by telephone. Prior research (Carnevale, 
Pruitt, & Seilheimer, 1981; Lewis & Fry, 1977) has shown that bargainers 
who are not able to see one another are less likely to use contentious 
tactics, are more likely to see relationships among the issues such as 
trade-offs, and are more likely to discover integrative solutions. 
These results suggest that the processes responsible for the effects of 
visual access and positive affect on bargaining outcome may be the same, 
namely, a reduction in the use of contentious tactics and an enhancement 
of integrative capacity. This has two implications for an experimental 
design that factorially crosses these factors. The first is that two main 
effects can be predicted, one for visual access and one for positive affect. 
Compared to visual access, the absence of visual access should result in 
lower levels of bargainer contentiousness, enhanced integration of issues 
(i.e., more trade-offs), and improved outcomes; this has been found in 
prior studies (Carnevale et al., 1981; Lewis & Fry, 1977). Similarly, 
compared to affect control, positive affect should result in lower levels 
of contentiousness, enhanced integration, and improved outcomes, a hy- 
pothesis heretofore untested. 
A second implication for an experimental design that crosses visual 
access/no visual access with positive affect/affect control is that there 
may be an interaction between these factors, since each factor may ob- 
scure the other in those conditions in which it is present. That is, if 
positive affect reduces contentiousness, enchances integrative capacity, 
and leads to improved outcomes, then a similar effect of visual isolation 
(no visual access) may not be observable under conditions of positive 
affect, because of the already optimal levels of outcome brought about 
by the other variable (positive affect). Also, if visual isolation reduces 
contentiousness, enhances integrative capacity, and leads to improved 
outcomes, then a similar effect of positive affect may not be observable 
because of the already optimal levels of outcome brought about by visual 
isolation. We did not expect the effects of these two factors to be additive, 
moreover, because we hypothesized the change in orientation and per- 
ception (reduced hostility and integration) underlying these effects to be 
categorical. That is, we view these effects to be a function of focus of 
attention or interpretation, which are discrete rather than continuous vari- 
ables. Thus, we expected an interaction between affect and visual access, 
such that visual access would have no impact on negotiation outcome in 
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the positive affect condition but would influence the process and impair 
the outcome of negotiation in the affect-control condition, and that posi- 
tive affect would have no impact on outcome in the no-visual-access con- 




The subjects were 80 males recruited by advertisement on the campus 
of the State University of New York at Buffalo. They were promised and 
paid $4 for their participation. Two subjects were employed in each ses- 
sion, making 40 dyads. Only dyads whose members were unknown to 
each other were allowed to participate. 
Negotiation Task 
The task closely resembled that used in previous research on integra- 
tive bargaining (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1982). Sub- 
jects, as negotiators, played the roles of buyer and seller in a wholesale 
appliance market. They were instructed to try to reach agreement on the 
prices of three commodities: televisions, vacuum cleaners, and type- 
writers. Each subject was given a profit schedule with the instruction that 
it could not be shown to the other. In the buyer’s schedule, TVs had the 
highest, and typewriters the lowest, profit potential. These priorities were 
reversed for the seller. Hence, the task permitted “logrolling,” in the 
sense that both parties could achieve high profits by exchanging conces- 
sions on their low-profit items (see Fig. 1). 
Design and Procedure 
The basic experimental design involved two between-subjects factors. 
The two factors were visual access vs no visual access and positive-affect 
induction vs none (a control condition for the affect manipulation). Two 
:, 
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FIG. 1. Our integrative bargaining task (buyer and seller profit schedules) 
6 CARNEVALE AND ISEN 
subjects were brought into the negotiation room at one time. The task 
was described as involving “negotiation between two simulated compa- 
nies.” The instructions were identical to those used by Lewis and Fry 
(1977) in their individualistic orientation conditions. The subjects were 
told to make as much profit for their company as possible, and they were 
each encouraged to make a minimum of $4600. 
In the no-visual-access conditions, a barrier that had separated the two 
subjects during the instructions remained in place for the negotiation. 
Thus, visual access was eliminated while verbal communication was not 
hindered. In the visual-access conditions, the barrier was removed for 
the negotiation, allowing the negotiators to see one another. 
In the positive affect conditions, just before the negotiation was to 
begin, the subjects were told that something had gone wrong with the 
tape recorder that was to record the negotiation and that it would take 
about 5 min to repair it. While they were waiting, the experimenter asked 
them to rate some stimulus materials for an unrelated experiment that he 
was doing. These materials consisted of 30 cartoons of the “B.C.” and 
New Yorker variety. The subjects were asked to sort them into two 
piles-those that were very funny and those not as funny. After the 
cartoons were sorted, the experimenter then continued with the final 
negotiation instructions. The experimenter gave each subject an 8 x 11 
pad of paper to be used as a scratch pad. The subjects were told that 
they could keep the pad, that it was a gift. The subjects in the affect- 
control conditions did not see the cartoons nor receive the gift. 
In all conditions, the experimenter sat in a room behind a one-way 
mirror during the negotiation. The experimenter operated a tape recorder 
that recorded the negotiation for later content analysis. Also behind the 
mirror were two observers whose task it was to monitor, using an event 
recorder, the visual behavior of the negotiators. This allowed the assess- 
ment of any direct relationships between nonverbal behaviors, such as 
staring, and the verbal tactics and outcome of negotiation. A time limit 
of 30 min was given for the negotiation. When the negotiation was over, 
the subjects completed a four-page questionnaire and were debriefed. 
The first page of the questionnaire asked the subjects to report their 
mood using 18-point bipolar scales (e.g., pleasant-unpleasant, negative- 
positive). The second page contained questions that measured the ne- 
gotiator’s insight into the other party’s priority preferences for the three 
items, something that Walton and McKersie (1965) have postulated con- 
tributes to the development of high joint benetit. If the respondent fully 
understood the order of importance to the other negotiator of the three 
appliances, a score of 2 was given. If the negotiator knew only the most 
important or the least important appliance to the other (but not both), a 
score of 1 was given. If the responses were totally incorrect, a score of 
0 was given. These scores were multiplied by the respondent’s confidence 
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in answering this item, which was rated on a 4-point scale. The resulting 
index ranged from a low of 0 to a high of 8. The third and fourth pages 
of the questionnaire contained items that assessed the subjects’ percep- 
tions of the tone of the negotiation and satisfaction with the outcome of 
the negotiation on 7-point scales. Ten dyads (negotiator pairs) were ran- 
domly assigned to each cell of the 2 x 2 design. 
Manipulation Checks 
RESULTS 
Support was found for the manipulation of positive affect. Negotiators 
who were in the positive affect conditions reported that their mood was 
more positive, F(l,36) = 5.59, p < .03, and more pleasant, F(1,36) = 
3.64, p < .07, than did negotiators in the affect-control conditions. Pos- 
itive affect also influenced the bargainers’ perceptions of the tone of the 
interaction in the visual-access conditions. Subjects in a positive state 
rated the interaction as more informal, F(l,l8) = 14.49, p < .OOl; more 
helpful, F(l,18) = 11.22, p < .Ol; closer, F(l,18) = 8.28, p < .Ol; and 
less businesslike, F(Z,18) = 4.37, p < .05.’ Because these measures were 
obtained following the negotiation, it is possible that the relationship be- 
tween the affect manipulation and these measures was due to the more 
positive negotiation process and outcome that had occurred in the posi- 
tive affect conditions. Evidence supporting this suggestion is the high 
correlation between the affect measures and satisfaction with the out- 
come of negotiation (? = S7). However, the measure of satisfaction with 
outcome was not affected by the mood manipulation, leading us to con- 
clude that the relationship between the affect manipulation and affect 
measures is not due entirely to satisfaction with outcome. 
Outcome of the Negotiation 
The measure of negotiation outcome was the sum of the value of the 
agreement to the buyer and the seller. Table 1 shows this value for each 
cell of the design. Statistically significant main effects were found for 
both the visual-access factor and the mood factor. As can be seen in Row 
I of Table I, negotiators who were prevented from seeing one another 
achieved higher outcomes from the negotiation than negotiators who were 
able to see one another, F(l,36) = 10.27, p < .Ol. Likewise, negotiators 
in whom positive affect had been induced achieved higher outcomes than 
negotiators not in a positive state, F(1,36) = 7.07, p < .02. However, 
these main effects are qualified by a significant interaction. In support of 
the interaction hypothesis, visual access had no impact on joint outcome 
in the positive-affect condition, but did have such an effect in the control- 
affect condition, F(l,36) = 16.9, p < .Ol. When bargainers were face to 
1 These ANOVA tests are simple-effect tests following up statistically significant interac- 
tions between the visual-access and affect factors. 
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TABLE I 
MEAN NEGOTIATION OUTCOME AND PROCESS MEASURES AS A FUNCTION OF AFFECT 




Trial and errorb 
Insight” 
Affect control 
Visual No visual 
access access 
8360(486) 9950(453) 
0.52 (0.30) -0.15 (0.07) 
- 0.42 (0.49) 0.21 (0.15) 
5.70 (6.02) 11.00 (2.63) 
Positive affect 
Visual No visual 
access access 
9830 (740) 9650 (972) 
-0.18 (0.21) -0.24 (0.05) 
0.29 (0.18) 0.00 (0.25) 
10.30 (4.60) 11.60 (3.69) 
Note. n = 10 in each condition. 
0 Standard deviations in parentheses. 
b Variances in parentheses. 
face, positive affect produced better outcomes (t(18) = 5.25, p < .Ol); 
when bargainers were not in a positive state, preventing them from seeing 
one another produced better outcomes (t(18) = 5.80, p < .Ol). This latter 
finding constitutes a replication of those of Lewis and Fry (1977) for a 
similarly constructed outcome measure. Similar interactions were ob- 
tained for the measures of negotiation process and are reported below. 
Verbal Process Measures 
The verbal process measures used in the present study were developed 
by content analyzing the tape recordings of the negotiations. The coding 
unit was a “statement” made by a negotiator, which was defined as 
anything said between the time that the other negotiator stopped speaking 
and started again. The same code could not be assigned to the same 
statement more than once. Each dyad received a score for each code 
consisting of the number of statements assigned to that code divided by 
the total number of statements made by the negotiators. Each code re- 
flected one of the tactic categories mentioned in the introduction: for 
example, there was a code for “threats.” Inter-rater reliabilities for this 
coding ranged above .77 (see Pruitt, 1981, for a detailed description of 
this coding system). 
Table 1, row 2, shows the results for the use of contentious tactics in 
each of the four cells of the design. The measure reported here is an 
average of the standardized scores of the codes for threats, positional 
commitments, persuasive arguments, and put-downs. This category was 
modeled after Walton and Mckersie’s (1965) description of distributive 
behavior. A threat was counted when a bargainer conveyed an intent to 
punish the other if the other failed to comply, e.g., “Agree to C on TVs 
or I take my business elsewhere.” A positional commitment was counted 
when a bargainer stated an intent not to move from a position, e.g., “C 
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on TVs is as low as I will go.” A persuasive argument was counted when 
a bargainer mentioned extraneous issues in an attempt to persuade the 
other to concede, e.g., “Our TVs are the best you can buy anywhere.” 
A put-down was counted when a bargainer negatively evaluated the other 
and derogated the other’s status or power, e.g., “That offer is like leaving 
a dime tip for your waiter, more insulting than anything else.” 
Significant main effects were obtained for both the visual-access and 
affect factors: Negotiators who were able to see one another employed 
significantly more contentious tactics than those not able to see one an- 
other, F(1,36) = 8.75, p < .Ol; and negotiators in whom positive affect 
had been induced employed significantly fewer contentious tactics, 
F(1,36) = 10.39, p < .Ol. These main effects, however, are qualified by 
a significant interaction between the two factors. The negotiators who 
could see one another, and who were not in a positive feeling state, used 
more contentious tactics than the negotiators in the other conditions, 
F(1,36) = 6.23, p < .02. Whereas positive affect reduced contentiousness 
in the visual-access condition (t(l8) = 2.80, p < .Ol), this factor had no 
reliable effect for subjects who were not able to see one another (j( 18) = 
0.78, ns). Visual access enhanced contentiousness in the control-affect 
conditions (t(l8) = 3.30, p < .OOl), but had no reliable effect for subjects 
in whom positive affect had been induced (t(l8) = 0.36, ns). As the reader 
will recall, results of the outcome of the negotiation mentioned earlier 
parallel those just reported: the negotiators in the visual-access/affect- 
control condition, who used the most contentious tactics, achieved the 
lowest outcomes. 
Results for the trial-and-error index suggested a similar pattern. This 
index, an average of standardized scores of the number of alternatives 
proposed, number of requests for reactions to offers, number of system- 
atic concessions, and number of concessions on low-priority items, has 
been found in prior research to reflect a cooperative negotiation process 
(Pruitt, 1981). A systematic concession was defined as any offer that 
provided a profit within $400 of the same bargainer’s previous offer and 
that involved a demand for greater profit on one item and less on another. 
A concession on a low-priority item was counted whenever an offer 
change involved a larger concession on the low-priority than on the high- 
priority item. The data on use of these cooperative tactics revealed a 
significant interaction between the two factors of this study. As shown 
in row 3 of Table 1, the least use of these tactics occurred in the visual- 
access/affect-control condition, F(1,36) = 8.14, p < .Ol. Whereas posi- 
tive alfect enhanced the use of trial and error tactics in the visual-access 
condition (t(18) = 2.60, p < .Ol), this factor had no reliable effect for 
subjects who were not able to see one another (t( 18) = 1 .OO, ns). Visual 
access reduced trial and error tactics in the control-affect conditions (t( 18) 
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= 2.33, p < .03), but had no reliable effect for subjects in whom positive 
affect had been induced (t(l8) = 1.32 p > .lO). No significant effects 
were obtained for the composite index of truthful information exchange. 
However, bargainers who were face to face exchanged more priority in- 
formation in the positive-affect condition than in the affect-control con- 
dition, F(1,18) = 5.24, p < .04. Priority information exchange was 
counted when a bargainer compared the relative value of the items, e.g., 
“I’d rather have a higher price on TVs than on typewriters.” 
The bargainers were asked to indicate their understanding of the other’s 
priority preferences for the three issues. As can be seen in row 4 of Table 
1, the lowest level of this variable is found in the face-to-face/affect- 
control condition. Although the interaction test was not statistically sig- 
nificant, F(1,36) = 2.06, p = .16, there was a tendency for bargainers 
who were face to face to have greater insight in the positive-affect con- 
dition than in the affect-control condition, F(l,18) = 3.69, p < .07, and 
those in the affect-control condition had greater insight in the non-visual- 
access condition than in the visual-access condition, F(1,18) = 5.59, p 
< .02. These simple-effect tests support our proposition that positive 
affect, like the absence of visual access, enhances the capacity for inte- 
gration. 
Nonverbal Process Measures 
As mentioned in the Method section, observers monitored the negoti- 
ators’ nonverbal behaviors. A measure of the percentage of looking was 
constructed, which was the proportion of time the negotiators spent 
looking at one another during the negotiation. This measure was posi- 
tively correlated with the use of contentious tactics, r(18) = .38, p < .05, 
and negatively correlated with the use of trial-and-error tactics, r( 18) = 
- .39, p < .05. This suggests that the use of the eyes in the negotiation 
context is competitive in nature and can be viewed as a nonverbal analog 
of a verbal contentious tactic. Although there was about half as much of 
this behavior in the positive-affect condition as in the affect-control con- 
dition (9.8% vs 18.3%), this was not a statistically significant difference 
as revealed by analysis of variance, F(1,18) = 1.78, p = .19. A closely 
related nonverbal index that was related to the affect manipulation was 
the mean proportion of time the bargainers spent not looking at one an- 
other and not speaking. This was greater in the positive-affect condition 
(60%) than in the affect-control condition (45%), suggesting that happy 
bargainers spend more time looking at their profit charts silently, F( 1,18) 
= 7.71, p < .Ol. The more they did this, the less they used contentious 
tactics, r(18) = - .60, p < .05, and the more they used the cooperative 
trial-and-error tactics, r(18) = .46, p =C .05. 
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DISCUSSION 
Lewis and Fry (1977) found that a physical barrier placed between 
competitively oriented bargainers led to a reduction in the use of dys- 
functional contentious tactics and to an increase in the likelihood of in- 
tegrative solutions; a barrier had no effect on cooperatively oriented bar- 
gainers. The present study replicates and extends these findings by re- 
producing the “barrier effect” and at the same time showing that the 
barrier has no effect on bargainers in whom positive affect has been 
induced. These results show, further, that positive affect can facilitate 
constructive, cooperative bargaining in face-to-face negotiations which 
would otherwise be marked by contentiousness and discord. 
A physical barrier separating bargainers reduces the use of contentious 
tactics, increases integrative capacity, and leads bargainers to discover 
integrative solutions. Positive affect also appears to reduce the use of 
contentious tactics, to increase integrative capacity, and to lead bar- 
gainers to discover integrative solutions, even if the negotiators can see 
one another. 
Lewis and Fry (1977) interpreted their findings in terms of visual con- 
tact and the role it plays in the perception of dominance. They argued 
that the perception of dominance is related to the use of contentious 
tactics, with these tactics being used in the hope of dominating one’s 
opponent or in response to attempts by the other to dominate. Lewis and 
Fry assumed that the elimination of visual contact would make it more 
difficult to perceive dominance and thus a physical barrier would reduce 
the use of contentious tactics. The results of the present study support 
their assumptions. Furthermore, the results of the present study suggest 
that positive affect also reduces the perception of dominance. This prop- 
osition is consistent with prior research that showed that exposure to 
nonhostile humor reduced subsequent aggression (Baron, 1984: Baron & 
Ball, 1974). 
Lewis and Fry (1977) suggested that negotiators who spend time gazing 
at one another may communicate the impression that their intent is to 
dominate the other rather than to solve the problem, and that such an 
impression may lead to increased use of contentious tactics. Thus, they 
suggested that deliberate attempts to reduce eye contact might facilitate 
successful negotiation. As shown in the present study, these effects may 
also be alleviated if positive affect can be induced in the negotiators 
before the start of negotiations. In the visual-access conditions of the 
present study, positive affect reduced the proportion of time the bar- 
gainers spent looking at and speaking to one another. This suggests that 
positive affect may facilitate successful negotiation either by accom- 
plishing that reduction in eye contact, or by otherwise reducing the per- 
12 CARNEVALE AND ISEN 
ception that the other is attempting to dominate. These factors may also 
enhance integrative capacity, which may additionally facilitate successful 
negotiation. 
The results of this study indicate that positive affect allows productive 
negotiation even when visual access is possible. In organizations, nego- 
tiation often must take place with visual access. Therefore, the use of 
positive affect may be a very useful tactic that may help negotiators 
discover optimal solutions. 
These results also imply that basic cognitive processes, such as those 
recently found to be facilitated by positive affect (Isen, 1983; Isen & 
Daubman, 1984; Isen et al., 1985)-those involved in categorization, 
similarity judgments, associations, and creative problem solving-are 
important in negotiation. The ability to integrate, to find creative ways of 
combining issues, and to develop novel solutions may be necessary for 
negotiators to achieve anything beyond obvious compromises. And these 
very abilities have recently been found to be enhanced by positive affect. 
Therefore, it may be for cognitive as well as social reasons that positive 
affect promotes integrative solutions in a bargaining situation, as we have 
found. 
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